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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
holding in Pennsylvania on this point, it is submitted that
our courts will apply the general rule as to prior creditors
in accordance with the view taken by the majority of
states.
Edgar K. Markley.
IS PA. SWINGING TO THE FEDERAL RULE ON
CORPORATE ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS?
"Contracts ultra vires of the corporation making them
are not merely voidable but wholly void and of no effect
and no performance by either party can give the unlawful
contract any validity." This startling statement was re-
cently made by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a
decision involving Pennsylvania law, and dealing with a
Pennsylvania corporation.'
Bedell, the plaintiff, was an employee of the Oliver H.
Bair Co. funeral directors, the defendants. While so em-
ployed, the plaintiff executed a "Benefit Bond" wherein it
was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that in
consideration of the payment of forty-six cents ($.46)
quarterly during the term of the plaintiff's life, the defend-
ant Co. would "care for and inter the remains" of the plain-
tiff at a total cost of $75. Failure to pay for three months
worked a forfeiture of the agreement. Plaintiff in pursu-
ance thereof paid the quarterly sums for twenty-eight
years, in the aggregate amount of $51.74. Being advised
that the contract was illegal, the plaintiff demanded from
the defendant the amount paid in and upon defendant's
refusal to refund the amount, sued in assumpsit. The
Superior Court, through Judge Cunningham, affirmed the
opinion of Judge Finletter in the court below finding that
the contract was one of insurance, was clearly ultra vires
of the defendant corporation, was therefore utterly void and
of no effect, and no action could be based upon it! How-
ever, as suit was brought in assumpsit the court allowed a
quasi-contractual recovery by the plaintiff.
'Bedell v. Oliver H. Bir Co. Inc., 158 Atl. 651.
285,
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Not a single Pennsylvania case appears in that part of
the opinion dealing with ultra vires, in support of the posi-
tion taken by the court, in spite of the fact that in an
.earlier Supreme Court opinion dealing with the defense of
ultra vires2 it was pointed out that "the cases are legion"
to the effect that ultra vires is no defense in such an action
on the contract. Moreover, in distinct contradiction to such
overwhelming authority in Pennsylvania the court quotes
at length from Justice Gray's opinion in the Pullman Palace
Car CG. case3 and the discussion appendant thereto in Pro-
fessor Keener's work on Quasi Contracts.4
As early as 1847 in Pennsylvania the principle under-
lying the modern majority rule on ultra vires as a defense
to corporate contracts-that one who has received benefits
under an illegal contract should not be allowed to avoid
the contractual burdens-was asserted by our Supreme
Court.5 The first decisive proclamation of this view how-
ever, was made in 1876 in the case of the Oil Creek and
Allegheny Railroad Co. v. Pa. Transportation Co.6 In that
case, the defendant railroad in its first agreement with the
plaintiff transportation company stipulated that it would
pay the plaintiff ten cents a barrel rebate on all oil, the
freight charge for which was forty-five cents or more per
barrel; a proportionately lower rebate on all oil shipped
the freight charge for which was less than forty-five cents
per barrel; but no rebate on any oil for the carriage of
which the freight charge was less than twenty cents per
barrel. Sometime later the defendant railroad suggested
a modification of the contract, to which the plaintiff as-
sented, to the effect that instead of the varying rebates, a
flat rebate of five cents per barrel would be paid, regardless
of the freight rate. At the time of the modification,
freight rates were falling and the defendants soon found
2286 Pa. 4051 at 412, 133 Atd. 551, quoting from 254 Pa. 422, 429,
98 Atl. 1052.
sCentral Transportation Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U.
S. 24, 59, 11 Supreme Court Reporter 478, 35 Lawyer's Edition 55.
4Page 272, note 1.
5Gibson, C. J. in Lestapies v. Ingraham, 5 Pa. at page 81.
683 Pa. 160.
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that by the modification it had made a bad bargain. Hav-
ing failed to pay the rebates agreed upon, the plaintiff sued
the defendant in an action of debt, defendant setting up
that the contract was ultra vires, illegal and void, and
hence no recovery could be had upon it. Paxson, J., in de-
ciding for the plaintiff said: "We do not think the defend-
ants are in a position to defend upon the ground of the
illegality of the contract. There were mutual covenants
and mutual advantages. The defendants had enjoyed the
advantages, such as they were. To the extent of the de-
mand in this suit, the contract was executed, and to say
now that it is ultra vires comes with an exceedingly bad
grace from the defendants. It may be that having shown
performance on their part they would have a right to
rescind the contract as to future transactions upon the
ground of illegality. But there is no rule of law which
permits them to retain both the benefits and the price."
The forceful language of this opinion was expressly ap-
proved and the rule of the case followed in the later case
of Wright v. Pipe Line Co.1
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co.$ a situation an-
alogous to the one under discussion, so far as the fate of
the case in the lower court was concerned, presented itself.
But it was disposed of by the appellate court in different
fashion from the present controversy. In that case the-
lower court held that a lease made between the parties, on
which suit was brought, being ultra vires, was null and
void. The Supreme Court reversing said, "In the present
case the cry of ultra vires is made by a party to the con-
tract-to the executed agreement from which it has al-
ready derived some benefit. If it is ultra vires now, it was
ultra vires then, when the contract was solemnly entered
into by thq appellee, and equity will turn a deaf ear for
relief from a compact intelligently and deliberately made
when prayed for by a party to it, whose conscience has
become quickened only when hopes are disappointed and
7101 Pa. 204, 47 Am. Reports 701.
$196 Pa. 452, 46 At. 431.
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expectations not realized." Then follows a quotation from
the leading cases discussed above.9
The case of Boyd v. American Carbon Black Co.10 is an
interesting one on the subject of ultra vires contracts.
Boyd entered into a partnership agreement with the Car-
bon Black Co., which was at the time of the agreement,
only an association of individuals, whereby he furnished
gas for the company's use, acquiring therefor a one-fifth
interest. Later the Co. was incorporated, Boyd buying
stock therein, later becoming a director. The corporation
succeeded to all the partnership rights under the agree-
ments. The corporation made another contract with Boyd,
stipulating that it would, jointly with Boyd, erect another
small factory, use the excess gas from Boyd's wells to
make carbon black and divide the profits so made. In viol-
ation of the agreement the company stopped operations at
the new factory, and agreed with the Columbian Co. to sell
to it its products, the profits to be divided equally, the de-
fendant company to shut down for one year, etc. Plaintiff
brought a bill in equity to have the agreement declared
void, for an accounting, dissolution of the partnership under
the second agreement, and other relief. The defense in-
terposed was that a corporation could not enter into a
partnership agreement; hence, being ultra vires, the con-
tract was null and void and no action could be brought
upon it. The court said in part: "The principal reason
given by the learned judge of the court below for sustain-
ing the demurrer is that the contract of partnership by the
corporation was ultra vires; that no corporation has au-
thority to share its corporate management with natural
persons in a partnership****. Assume that the partner-
ship has not now and never had a legal existence;****
while it had no legal existence it had one in fact ; and the
other partner fully performed; the corporation had the full
benefit of the contract up to the time that it concluded
that it was more profitable to violate its agreements. 'It
9Wright v. Pipe Line Co., 101 Pa. 204; Oil Creek. and Allegheny
River Railroad Co. v. Penna. Transportation Co., 83 Pa. 160.
10182 Pa. 206, 37 Atd. 937.
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may be prima facie ultra vires for an incorporated com-
pany to enter into a partnership with other persons' but
all the authorities hold that, notwithstanding the prima
facies, if it be shown that the other partner had fully per-
formed his obligations under the contract, this plea will
not avail. 'A corporation may not avail itself of the de-
fense of ultra vires when the contract has been in good
faith performed by the other party, and it has had the full
benefit of the performance and of the contract'."
Trust Co. v. Library Hall Co."' involved a mortgage
transaction which was ultra vires. The defendant company
had been restricted by the legislature in the total amount
of mortgage indebtedness it could contract. It executed
a mortgage to the plaintiff trustees, who issued bonds on
the security thereof to various persons in small denomin-
ations. On foreclosure of the mortgage, the defense was
that the contract was ultra vires, null and void. The court
said: "But assuming that by legislative language some-
what obscure the authority to borrow $150,000 additional
was doubtful, the corporation, this mortgagor, will not be
heard to raise the question of ultra vires. It assumed to
have authority to mortgage, received the money, and ap-
plied it to corporate purposes. 'The law never sustains a
defense of this nature out of regard for the defendant'."
From these decisions, it is apparent that so far as
Pennsylvania is concerned the modern majority rule as to
the effect of ultra vires on a corporate contract, and not
the Federal rule as asserted in the Pullman Co. case, 2 is the
law of Pennsylvania. More than a score more cases to the
same effect could be cited for the same proposition."
It is true that the case under discussion does vary
11189 Pa. 263, 42 Atl. 129.
12 See note 3.
'$A few of the more prominent cases are Wrightsville Hardware
Co. v. McElroy, 254 Pa. 422 at 429, 98 Atl. 1052; Ramble v. Pa. Coal
Co., 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 39; Lemon v. E. Palestine Rubber' Co. 260
Pa. 28, 33, 103 Ati. 510; Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 411, 133
Ati. 551; Presbyterian Board for the Relief of Disabled Ministers v.
Gilbee, 212 Pa. 310, 61 Atl. 925; also 14a C. J. p. 320, note 88; also
Fletcher on Corporations, No. 1541 to 1547.
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materially in its facts from some of the cases discussed,
for here the contract is being rescinded, the action being
for money had and received, while in the previous cases
the contract was being affirmed and an action for its breach
or similar redress pursued. Nor is there any fault to find
with the conclusion reached by the court, for admittedly it
was just and equitable. But, it is submitted, the court erred
in accepting as the basis for its conclusion, the federal view
that the contract being ultra vires was null and void. More
consonant with the prior Pennsylvania law on the subject
would have been the legal theory-ratio decidendi-that
the contract so far as executed, was valid; that the corpor-
ation by its act was estopped to deny its validity as being
ultra vires; but as the contract was made under a mutual
mistake it could be rescinded by the performing party and
an action for money had and received, in quasi contract,
brought, wherein any performance by the corporation
could be set up in defense.
Loose statements such as this, while seemingly trifling,
have furnished no end of trouble ihl the law, have led to
absurd conclusions and palpable injustices, as evidenced by
the contortion of a famous maxim in Bilbie v. Lumley 4 and
should be carefully guarded against by our courts.
Robert E. Knupp
142 East 469, per Ellenborough, L.C.J.-Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
